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Abstract 
 
Like in many low moor regions in East Germany, long-standing intensive arable farming - 
enabled by complex melioration - has caused soil deterioration and high water runoff in the 
‘Schraden’. More than ten years of economic and political transformation has worsened the 
situation and even added new problems. The visible consequences are drought periods in the 
summer, waterlogged plots in the spring and worn-down water management facilities that 
operate in an uncoordinated or even unauthorised way. 
 
It is here argued that the reallocation of property rights on melioration systems, together with 
ineffective co-ordination mechanisms, have impeded appropriate land use. Transformation-
related problems like the discontinuity of land property rights, the unclear legal situation 
regarding melioration plants built in socialist times, and highly-fragmented land ownership 
have not been effectively dealt with by the newly-established Water Association and Water 
Administration, respectively. Profoundly heterogeneous water-user interests and the 
complexity of ecosystem relations have contributed to the persistence of the problems. 
 
This analysis is based on regional planning material as well as on qualitative, semi-structured 
interviews with local stakeholders, representatives of the administration and politicians at all 
levels of government.  
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1. Introduction 
Like in many low moor regions in East Germany, long-standing intensive arable farming - 
enabled by complex melioration1 - has caused soil deterioration and high water runoff in the 
‘Schraden’. More than ten years of economic and political transformation has worsened the 
situation and even added new problems. The visible consequences are drought periods in the 
summer, waterlogged plots in the spring and worn-down water management facilities that 
operate in an uncoordinated or even unauthorised way. 
 
These water-related agri-environmental problems are, to varying degrees, typical for many 
low moor regions in Brandenburg and East Germany. There, political priorities have only 
recently started to focus on the landscape water regime. However, predominantly technical 
solutions such as increased financial support for Water Associations, and for practical 
measures which help keep water in the regions longer, have been brought forward (Landgraf, 
2001). That said, a variety of recent research points out that more than merely additional or 
optimised instruments are needed to deal with complex and dynamic agri-environmental 
problems. Within this research the role of property rights and governance structures for a 
sustainable management of common pool resources like water is frequently stressed (Ostrom, 
1998; Vermillion, 1999; Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999).  
 
Furthermore, the need for institutional change towards institutions of (environmental) 
sustainability is postulated. It is argued that specific ecosystem characteristics require 
adequate property rights regimes and appropriate governance structures (Hagedorn, Arzt and 
Peters, 2002). The presented case also relates to a country in transition: East Germany is 
experiencing drastic changes in the economic and political system as well as land restitution, 
property rights formation processes and agricultural restructuring. It therefore seems 
reasonable to ask if such a “two-fold transformation” can possibly be achieved simultaneously 
(Hagedorn and Gatzweiler, 2002; Hagedorn, 2002). In order to develop institutions of 
(environmental) sustainability with regard to water management, it is of vital importance to 
understand and interpret the transition-related changes in property rights regimes and 
governance structures in this field. 
 
In this paper, it is argued that the reallocation of property rights for melioration systems, 
together with ineffective co-ordination mechanisms, have impeded appropriate land use in the 
‘Schraden’. In view of this, the paper explores the impact of transition-related changes upon 
property rights (on melioration systems as well as on land), governance structures and water 
user interests. Furthermore, it investigates how these changes are related to this problem, what 
impact they have on land use and ecology, and what lessons can be learned from the analysis. 
 
Section 2 will give a brief overview of the technical development, property rights regimes and 
governance structures before transition began in 1990. Furthermore, the underlying interest 
structure and the effects on land use and ecology are presented and discussed. Section 3 will 
briefly describe the changes in interest structure, property rights regimes and governance 
structures during the transformation, and will discuss related problems and deficiencies in 
                                                 
1 Generally, (complex) melioration measures are all measures which lead to a sustainable increase of 
productivity and cultivability of agriculturally or forestal used areas (KÖNKER, 1991: 147). This also 
includes (rural) road construction and structuring land. However, only hydromelioration measures like 
drainage and irrigation are being discussed in this paper. 
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detail. The accompanying effects on land use and ecology are also highlighted. The final 
section summarises the findings and draws some conclusions. 
 
The paper is based on the analysis of qualitative, semi-structured interviews with local 
stakeholders such as farmers, environmentalists and associations, but also with representatives 
of the administration and politicians on all levels of government. Moreover, available 
planning materials, regional statistics and other available local information for the region 
were consulted. Nevertheless, this paper primarily summarises and clusters the relevant 
stakeholders' subjective perceptions of the problems which they face. 
2. Development of melioration systems prior to 1990 
In the low moor region ‘Schraden’, the first melioration measures were carried out in the 15th 
century. They were intensified in the second half of the 19th century mainly for the extension 
of grassland farming in an area that was still dominated by inaccessible alder forests and 
swamps. Furthermore, it was intended to reduce the often disastrous effects of seasonal floods 
on the villages and towns in the region, and to minimise health risks like malaria that are 
associated with extensive swamps (AVP, 1998: 12). In the 1960s and 70s, melioration 
measures found their peak in the ‘complex melioration’ carried out in the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR). Here, one of the central objectives was the intensification of agricultural 
production in order to reach (national) subsistence farming targets and subsequently even to 
export agricultural products. Therefore, the logical consequence was "to eliminate obstacles 
which slow down (agri-) industrial production", (Dokumentation ...1977 as cited in AVP, 
1998: 8f, own translation), such as the annual flooding or waterlogging of land, and to turn 
ground water-dominated land – often used as grassland – into more productive arable land. 
Large drainage systems, mostly open ditches but also various forms of underdrainage, were 
built to ‘optimise’ the ground water table. This system of ditches and channels was also 
equipped with weirs, dam plants and pumping stations to enable irrigation by flood and even 
by infiltration if necessary. By 1997, there were 330 different ditches and small channels of 
about 300 kilometres in total length, equipped with about 170 weirs and dam plants, that were 
able to regulate the water table in the whole ‘Schraden’, which covers about 10,000 ha of 
agricultural land (AVP, 1998: 33ff). The melioration infrastructure was designed to cover the 
entire area and to meet the needs of large agricultural firms farming very large plots. The 
relatively low number of weirs compared with the total length of the ditches indicates that 
there was no need to regulate the water table for small plots. 
2.1 Property rights on land and on melioration systems 
Apart from big land owners, who had their land appropriated before 1949 under Soviet 
occupation, and some exceptional cases, the vast majority of private farmers and land owners 
in the GDR were not formally expropriated (Peinemann, 1995: 225ff; Laschewski, 1998). 
However, during collectivisation, they were forced to bring their assets into collectively-
organised production units (Swinnen and Mathijs, 1997). Hence, only usage rights were 
allocated to these agricultural firms, which were integrated in the central-planning system. 
Essentially, this meant that land owners had little or no influence regarding their own interests 
(Schüler, 1991: 34f). Further, because a land rent was not paid, formal property rights became 
meaningless. Because of that, the distribution of land was kept fragmented almost as it was in 
the 1950s, while the agricultural firm structure underwent immense changes (Laschewski, 
1998). As can practically be seen in the ‘Schraden’, these changes, in qualitative terms, were 
often linked to comprehensive land consolidation measures and extensive melioration 
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measures. In other words, plots that had little infrastructure before might now be found 
‘enriched’ with ditches, weirs and dam plants (see also Swinnen and Mathijs, 1997, for 
similar observations in CEE Countries). These assets of the newly built melioration systems 
were regarded as collective property. Nevertheless, firm responsibilities and rights for specific 
categories of the melioration system - rather than formal property rights - had been allocated 
to different organisations and administrative levels2, as is outlined in Figure 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Allocation of responsibilities with regard to melioration systems in the GDR 
2.2 Governance structures for melioration systems 
Figure 1 shows that planning, building and, partially, financing responsibilities were 
predominantly aggregated at upper local levels. In contrast, most of the maintenance and 
operation activities were delegated to local melioration co-operatives with compulsory 
membership for all agricultural firms. Supported by the Water Management Directorates 
(WWD) and the Departments of Water Management at the ‘Kreis’ level, these large-unit 
firms could easily provide the necessary technical infrastructure, human resources and 
financial means to maintain and operate, as members of the melioration co-operative, the 
lion's share of the infrastructure. Since increasing agricultural production was the overriding 
goal for all firms and because a well-functioning melioration system safeguarded high 
production yields, the interest structure among the firms regarding maintenance and operation 
                                                 
2 In the GDR, there were 15 counties (‘Bezirke’). Each ‘Bezirk’ consisted of several rural or urban districts 
(‘Kreise’), which administrated the cities and municipalities,  (‘Gemeinden’). 
 
Compulsory membership Advising in melioration matters 
Main ditches 
‚Z-Vorfluter‘ 
incl. weirs 
Outfall ditches 
‚L-Vorfluter‘ 
incl. weirs 
Small ditches 
‚K-Vorfluter‘ 
incl. weirs 
Responsible 
overall 
Categories of 
melioration 
plants 
Buildinga 
Maintaining 
and 
Operating 
Water Management 
Directorates 
Dept. of Water 
Management  
of the ‚Kreise‘ 
Agricultural 
Co-operatives, 
State-owned farms 
State owned company ‚VEB Meliorationsbau‘ of the ‚Bezirk‘ 
(sometimes by Melioration Co-operatives) 
Melioration Co-operatives 
Agricultural Co-operatives and state owned farms 
By order of the Water 
Management Directorates 
By order of the  
councils of the ‚Kreise‘ 
Planning Water Management Directorates (WWD), together with the state-owned ‚VEB KWP‘ and the councils of the ‚Kreise‘ 
a Financed in varying degrees by funds from agricultural firms, low-interest-loans and state subsidies. 
Ministry for Nature Conservation,  
Environment Conservation and Water Management 
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was fairly homogeneous. Co-ordination of those activities was also facilitated by the large 
size of the production units. As was pointed out during many interviews, local actors 
perceived this structure as well-functioning and smoothly and satisfyingly-operating. 
Effects on land use and ecology 
 
The extension of drainage activities almost immediately resulted in a drastically lower water 
table, which enabled a change in land use towards increasingly intensive arable farming. The 
whole ‘Schraden’ area covers circa 11,400 ha. Presently, about 88% of this land is used as 
agricultural land, predominantly for arable farming. Forests cover only about 2%. However, 
long-standing intensive arable farming of this meliorated low moor has led to an increasing, 
mostly irreversible degradation of soil (e.g., bog subsidence). During arid periods, the soils 
run dry and lose more and more fertile soil and organic matter due to wind erosion.3 Soil 
degradation, together with soil compaction from the use of heavy machinery, has led to the 
increasing inability of the soil to hold water; thus, a high level of water runoff will be 
experienced if not held back by well-functioning and co-ordinated weirs and dam plants. This 
becomes even more important since the overall water balance in Brandenburg is negative4. 
Furthermore, the extensive use of fertilisers and pesticides in the ‘Schraden’, fostered by the 
relatively high water table and the high permeability of the soil substratum, has caused 
groundwater pollution. Another negative environmental effect can be seen in the extremely 
low ecological value and very low self-cleaning ability of the highly regulated, mostly 
artificial running waters (AVP, 1998). 
 
Such severe environmental problems caused by hydromelioration measures – drainage and 
irrigation – have also been observed in many other countries. They “are not solely restricted 
to increasing pollution or loss of habitat for native plants and animals; they cover the entire 
range of environmental components, such as soil, water, air, energy, and the socio-economic 
system.” Some of those measures even “…threaten the long-term productivity of the 
irrigation and drainage projects themselves, as well as the natural resource base.” 
(Dougherty and Hall, 1995: iii). In particular, drainage can be seen as a “source of cumulative 
[environmental] effects because of its temporally repetitive and spatially expansive nature.” 
(Spaling and Smit, 1995: 99). Some of the environmental effects, however, are more indirect. 
In many cases, melioration measures only enable intensive, arable land use – e.g., on former 
low moors, wetlands, etc. – accompanied by soil erosion, soil compaction, pollution with 
nitrates and pesticides, often monotonous field structures and loss of biodiversity (AVP, 1998; 
Turnock, 1998). These effects are especially severe in transition countries, where successes in 
agriculture are often based on the “plundering of the natural resources” (Turnock, 1998: 
385). 
3. Melioration systems in transformation since 1990 
Until 1989, all interests regarding the management of the melioration system had been 
secondary to agricultural production goals. However, the interest structure significantly 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, the negative effects of drainage on the low moors in Brandenburg, in general, were already 
officially perceived in 1987, when LEHRKAMP (1987) noted that due to soil degradation the average yield 
of arable farming had fallen back to the pre-complex melioration level in some areas in the Randow-Welse-
Bruch in Brandenburg. 
4 Despite Brandenburg being the ‘Land’ with most lakes and open waters in Germany, it suffers from a lack of 
water, especially in the summer. The reasons are over-drainage, predominantly sandy soils, decreasing 
ground water levels caused by open cast mining, and a negative climatic water balance in some regions 
(LANDGRAF, 2001; KALWEIT, 1998). 
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diversified after unification. The respective requirements, primarily concerning the ground 
water table, of the newly restructured and re-organised agricultural firms have become very 
heterogeneous, and now very much depend on farm size and location (e.g., upstream or 
downstream), crop structure and economic performance. Presently, thirteen different 
agricultural enterprises farm the agricultural land in the ‘Schraden’ (AVP, 1998: 78). 
 
Furthermore, as the interviews showed, interests regarding nature conservation have become 
much more prominent. Though conservationists generally agree on higher ground water 
tables, and often join forces to bring the degradation of the low moor to a halt, different 
visions of the future ‘Schraden’ prevail. These include the vision of a sustainable, appropriate 
or more habitat-adapted form of agricultural land use, but also aim to reverse the degradation 
process as far as possible, including the prevention of agricultural land use.  
 
As became clear during the interviews, farming and nature conservation are not the only 
divergent interests. Other interest groups like industry, housing/settlement construction and 
transport services demand ‘safe’ ground water tables to avoid flooding and other damages. 
For example, operators of gravel pits in this region require sufficient flood protection to make 
open cast mining possible. On the other hand, they need a sufficiently high ground water table 
in order to use floating excavators.  
3.1 Changes in property rights on land and melioration systems 
Shortly after unification, collectivised land in the ‘Schraden’ was restituted to the legal 
owners, with full property rights being returned to them. By doing this, the fragmented land 
ownership structure was basically revived. However, most of the new/old land owners quickly 
leased their land to the newly restructured and re-organised co-operatives; these are now joint 
stock companies, limited liability companies or producer co-operatives. Compared with the 
former co-operatives, the new agricultural firms are smaller, more focused enterprises 
predominantly farming on leased land. 
 
In 1994, the Brandenburg Water Act finally replaced the GDR Water Act, formally 
reorganising, among other things, the responsibilities and rights for rivers, channels and 
ditches and separating them into two categories (BbgWG). Only those belonging to the (new) 
1st order were declared property of the ‘Land’5 and consequently had to be taken care of by 
the ‘Land’. Regarding the melioration systems, only some of the former ‘Z-Vorfluter’ now 
belong to this 1st category. As determined in § 5 of the Brandenburg Water Act, 
corresponding with §§ 10 and 12 of the federal Law on Melioration Plants (MeAnlG), all 
open waters of the 2nd order, including the weirs and dam plants, were to become legal 
property of the owners of the bordering lands. In the following sections, some rather 
problematic implications of these changes in interest and property rights will be highlighted. 
3.1.1 Legal issues 
After unification and until the introduction of the Brandenburg Water Act in 1994, the future 
legal status - and hence the rights and responsibilities for maintenance and operation - of the 
melioration systems had been unclear. But the new law did not fully solve the problem 
because, firstly, the related federal Law on Melioration Plants of 1994 only explicitly ruled on 
                                                 
5 In the Federal Republic of Germany, there are 16 states (‘Länder’). Each ‘Land’ consists of several rural or 
urban districts (‘Landkreise’), which administrate cities and municipalities, (‘Gemeinden’). 
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the property rights of ‘drainage’ works on 2nd order waters (§ 12 MeAnlG). They now 
belonged to the respective land owners that bordered the open waters. However, most weirs 
and dam plants were intended, and built, for ‘irrigation’ use not covered by this clause 
(Pollack, 1991: 18). The same law determined that these ‘irrigation’ works should only 
become property of the land owners from the year 2000 onwards (§ 10 MeAnlG). Secondly, 
as the interview with a representative of the Lower Water Agency revealed, Water Authorities 
could not enforce the related duties or responsibilities because land owners could not be held 
legally responsible for assets on their land – such as ditches or weirs - they had neither wanted 
nor built directly.6 Here, the issue of ‘successors in interest’ to the organisations and 
administrative authorities once responsible for the melioration infrastructure before 1990 was, 
and still is, widely pending. 
3.1.2 Land ownership and Leasehold issues 
After the restitution of land in the ‘Schraden’, almost all of the owners decided to lease their 
land to new agricultural enterprises instead of starting their own farming business or using the 
land for other purposes. Following the statements of interviewed tenants, most of the land 
owners do not know about the melioration works on their land or are not aware of the related 
(legal) rights and duties. What is more, many owners no longer live in the region, have 
nothing to do with the farming business and own only very small plots. There are also cases 
where the owners are not known, cannot be found or the ownership is legally disputed. 
However, in every case, the owner of, for example, a weir would have to agree explicitly to 
any maintenance or operating measures to be carried out. Otherwise, the very activity would 
be regarded as illegal. It is only a recent development that most new or renewed lease 
contracts contain some clause transferring all rights and duties related to the melioration 
works to the tenant for the time of the lease.  
3.1.3 External effects 
The problems mentioned above are exacerbated by the farmers’ argument that individual 
costs for the maintenance and operation of the weirs and dam plants would result in non-
exclusive benefits since a functioning and operated weir, e.g., enabling a sufficiently high 
ground water table to avoid draught, does not simply benefit the individual farmers’ plot. In 
most cases, it would be technically impossible to avoid positive external effects for 
neighbouring farmers. More importantly, there would be no means to make other 
beneficiaries share these considerably high costs. In turn, operating - perhaps illegally - a weir 
causing waterlogging on plots of a neighbouring farmer might result in either high social 
costs, or an unwanted charge at the Water Authority. This holds even more true since all 
measures which put the ground water table above or below a certain level have to be approved 
by the Lower Water Authority (§§ 37 and 51 BbgWG).  
 
To sum up, external effects and legal insecurities, together with a fragmented land ownership 
structure and a high number of short-term lease contracts have reduced the incentives for most 
farmers to maintain, invest in, or (officially) operate the assets in question. As a consequence, 
melioration works with purely local importance were basically left to their own since 1989, 
and have since been operated haphazardly, individually and mostly illegally (AVP, 1998). 
                                                 
6 It is interesting to note that on the one hand, owners refuse to take on duties related to ‘unwillingly-inherited’ 
melioration works. But virtually nobody complains about the changed quality and higher value of the now 
arable land enabled solely by these works (for a similar observation, see HAGEDORN, 2002: 8f). 
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3.2 Changes in governance systems: the local level 
At the local level, the large co-operatives disintegrated into smaller and more focused 
enterprises with different legal forms and ownership structures (see also Wiegand, 1994 and 
Laschewski, 1998). As a consequence, the melioration co-operatives - inter-firm organisations 
of enterprises which directly competed in the market - were soon dissolved without substitute. 
However, in order to ensure the necessary runoff of water and hence to avoid damage by 
floods or a high ground water table, the 26 Water Associations, ‘Wasser- und 
Bodenverbände’ were formally enacted by the Brandenburg Water Act of 1994, in 
conjunction with the Brandenburg Water Association Act of 1995, to take over the 
maintenance and cleaning duties of 2nd order ditches, or more generally, to “ensure the 
functionality of the open waters” (§§ 78 and 79 BbgWG, own translation; BbgWVG, WVG). 
These Water Associations were founded in the years after the unification but prior to the 
passing of these acts. For the ‘Schraden’ area, the Water Association ‘Kleine-Elster Pulsnitz’ 
has taken over these responsibilities and is supervised by the ‘Land’ Environment Agency (§ 
80(4) BbgWG). It is compulsory for all municipalities, representing those land owners subject 
to land rates (‘Grundsteuern’) to be members of the Associations (§ 2(1) BbgWVG).7 As the 
interviews with farmers confirmed, the tenants effectively pay the membership fee as an 
implicit part of the rent. The following sections will discuss some of the problems related to 
these local-level changes. 
3.2.1 Financial limitations 
Like other Water Associations in Brandenburg, the activities of the regional Water 
Association ‘Kleine Elster-Pulsnitz’ have to be financed solely by membership fees since 
practically no regular subsidies from the ‘Land’ are being paid. As stated by representatives 
of the Water Association, the available funds are only sufficient to do the compulsory tasks - 
basically maintaining and cleaning the ditches. The owner of the respective land has to 
tolerate these activities (§ 84 BbgWG). However, non-compulsory measures like maintaining 
or operating the weirs or dam plants are only carried out occasionally and if spare funds are 
available. What is more, before beginning with any of those activities the respective owner - 
or tenant - has to agree explicitly.  
 
Instruments to mitigate the problem include state support programs, which could be used at 
least for project-related maintenance tasks, but not for covering operating costs. However, 
depending on the program, the Water Association or another corporate body has to co-finance 
these funds with between 20% and 50% of their own funds. Here again, the capital resources 
of the Water Association are stated as the limiting factor.  
3.2.2 Solidarity principle 
Theoretically, the financial limitations of the Water Association could be eased by higher 
membership fees in order to make it financially ‘profitable’ to take care of the weirs and dam 
plants. However, many of the interviews indicated that these fees are already perceived as 
rather high by contributors in the region and a further increase seems politically unacceptable. 
Furthermore, there is no differentiation in membership fees corresponding to the real 
distribution of benefits of the association’s activities. Whereas the federal Water Associations 
Act (WVG) allows for this differentiation, a solidarity principle was adopted for the 
                                                 
7 Additionally, other beneficiaries, e.g., railway companies, can be voluntary members (§ 2(2) BbgWVG). 
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Brandenburg Water Act. In other words, the membership fees can only be proportionate to 
land size (§ 80(1) BbgWG).  
 
Overall, the present Water Association appears to be an inadequate substitute for the 
dissolved melioration co-operatives due to its limited statutory rights and its small financial 
room for manoeuvre.  
3.3 Changes in governance systems: the administrative levels 
Concerning the water management and planning system at the administrative levels, no 
substantial implementations of new rules and structures took place until 1992, when the Water 
Management Directorate ‘Oder Havel’, which had been responsible for the Brandenburg 
territory, was dissolved (Verordnung, 1992). In Brandenburg, only those tasks for which the 
Water Management Directorates and the ‘Kreise’ had been responsible were safeguarded by 
the ‘Land’ Environment Agency ‘(‘Landesumweltamt’), which operated like a ‘successor in 
interest’ to the ‘WWD’. In 1994, the Brandenburg Water Act established a new administrative 
structure which basically follows the example of the old ‘Länder’, putting emphasis on self-
government on the communal level. Figure 2 gives a brief overview of the different 
administrative layers of Water Authorities and Water Agencies in Brandenburg in relation to 
the ‘Landkreis Elbe-Elster’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Administrative layers of Brandenburg's Water Authorities and Water Agencies in 
relation to the ‘Landkreis Elbe-Elster’ 
 
 
In the following sections, some of the administration-related problems will be discussed in 
greater detail. 
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Department W: ‚Prevention of Water Pollution and Water Management‘ 
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Lower Water Agency 
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3.3.1 Complete Restructuring 
As taken from the interviews with representatives from the Lower Water Agency in the 
‘Landkreis Elbe-Elster’, the restructuring process has been experienced as drastic and 
complete, but not smooth. It was stated that almost all relations between the different levels of 
the newly established Water Authorities had to be rebuilt from scratch. This process has not 
yet been completed satisfactorily and still confines inter-authority communication to that 
which is absolutely necessary. The process of old and new civil servants gathering 
competence in the newly established laws and rules and exploring new rooms for manoeuvre 
was described as time consuming and toilsome. The same would hold true for the relations of 
the Water Authorities to water users, (water) associations and interest groups, other 
administrative agencies, the municipalities and the general public. This would have been 
exacerbated by the fact that the restructuring followed completely new administrative and 
political structures. 
3.3.2 Organisational Embeddedness 
As shown in Figure 2, the Lower Water Authority is operating at the ‘Landkreis’ level, 
meaning that practically all decisions related to water management are made from the 
viewpoint of the ‘Landkreis’ as a whole. In other words, the eventual power of decision 
making in this field rests with the ‘Landrat’, who is the head of the administration of the 
‘Landkreis’. Furthermore, the Lower Water Agency, which is responsible for the ‘practical’ 
work and professional input, is organisationally subordinate to the Environmental Agency of 
the ‘Landkreis’, which itself is subordinate to the ‘Department of Economics and 
Environment’. This organisational structure is somewhat precarious. Considering statements 
of the Lower Water Agency, it appears that executive decisions are more or less politically 
opportunistic rather than purely professional. Depending on the issue, the particular interests 
of non-water related sub-departments of the Lower Environment Authority, as well as those 
interests articulated from other sub-departments like ‘Agriculture’ or ‘Structural 
Development’ of the ‘Department of Economics and Environment’, not only influence the 
choice of key issues, but also the (final) decisions themselves. A kind of ‘filter’ effect that 
correlates with political priorities at the ‘Landkreis’ level can now, at the very least, be 
noticed. Furthermore, it was presumed that this constellation might have contributed to the 
fact that until recently the priority of the Water Authorities was on “more urgent” issues like 
improving the public wastewater disposal system and ensuring the public water supply. This 
would have required substantial financial, human and technical resources. 
3.3.3 Trans-boundary interrelations 
As previously mentioned, the present structure of water administration follows political-
administrative borders. One might suspect that this impedes or even hinders the efficient and 
co-ordinated handling of a complex, transboundary biophysical system like the landscape 
water regime. On the other hand, one should not underestimate the implications of 
introducing or strengthening river basin management for existing institutional configurations 
and organisational structures (Göhler, 1997; for a general discussion on ‘problems of fit’ and 
‘problems of interplay’, see Moss, 2001). In fact, the water regime of the ‘Schraden’ is 
strongly determined by the water inflow from the Brandenburg ‘Landkreis Oberspreewald-
Lausitz’, and also from the ‘Land Sachsen’. However, as found in the interviews from the 
Lower Water Agency, there are almost no joint activities, information exchanges or co-
ordination meetings between the respective Water Authorities.  
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3.3.4 Water Management Plans 
To actively and efficiently shape and regulate complex water management systems – ideally 
integrating all water user interests - water management framework plans 
(Wasserwirtschaftliche Rahmenpläne) and water management plans (Bewirtschaftungspläne) 
based on hydrological analysis are a necessary prerequisite. Taking this into account, §§ 36 
and 36b of the federal Water Management Act (WHG) even determine that the Supreme 
Water Authority must provide such plans for all river basins. However, in Brandenburg there 
are few drafts for water management framework plans, even fewer drafts for detailed water 
management plans, and none are available for the ‘Schraden’. Inevitably, in most cases the 
Water Authorities only ‘react’ rather incidentally to acute problems or demands of interest 
groups, other agencies or the public. This is certainly fostered by the fact that only the main 
canals or ditches are equipped - at least partly - with devices (Pegel) able to measure the water 
table. Thus, reliable monitoring and sanctioning is almost impossible. 
 
It might be reasonable to presume that the above-described administration-related problems 
have negatively affected the performance of the Lower Water Agency responsible for the 
‘Schraden’. However, the question to what degree - if at all - each issue has contributed to the 
persistence of the water management problems in the region remains open. The next section 
will highlight some of the effects on ecology and land use caused or aided by the changes 
described in the sections above. 
3.4 Effects on ecology and land use 
Sustainability, quality and productivity of arable and grassland farming in the Brandenburg 
region heavily depend on a highly complex system of irrigation and drainage that was 
established before 1989. However, most of the water management devices such as weirs and 
dam plants have not been maintained since then. Instead, they have been operated without co-
ordination (or not at all) and they have by now mostly deteriorated. The visible consequences 
are drought periods in the summer caused by high water run-off, and waterlogged plots in the 
spring, both of which frequently result in negative income effects for farmers. The decreasing 
availability of water throughout the year has already forced many farmers to reduce their 
portfolio of crops, which increasingly results in monocultures of non-water intensive crops. 
Nevertheless, intensive farming has continued in the ‘Schraden’, which further contributes to 
the deterioration of soils and the decrease of soil quality (AVP, 1998; own interviews). 
 
In 1998, an agri-structural pre-planning (Agrarstrukturelle Vorplanung-AVP) was carried out. 
It focussed on water management problems in the ‘Schraden’ and stated that a ‘business-as-
usual’ strategy would make agricultural land use impossible in the medium- or long-term. 
However, the same study also pointed out that sustainable farming land use, based on a 
functioning melioration system, was possible if changes towards a more habitat-adapted land 
use concept, as well as the renaturation of some open waters, were considered. Hence, 
sustainable agricultural production would not necessarily contradict the goals of nature 
conservation and water management (AVP, 1998). Still, interviews with most farmers in the 
region pointed out that given the unpredictability of market forces and agricultural policy, the 
costs and risks involved are considered to be high.  
 
In many other transition countries, similar developments and effects can be observed. There, 
the transformation process has also resulted in the decay of irrigation and/or drainage systems. 
The restitution process has often caused or re-established highly fragmented (private) land 
ownership, and has also resulted in smaller agricultural production units. Furthermore, 
SCHLEYER - Economic and Ecological Transformation Processes in East German Water Management Regimes 
Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA)  
Discussion Paper No 9  
14
essential parts of the previously co-operatively owned and managed melioration systems – 
i.e., non land-assets – were also redistributed to private owners/farmers. Due to external 
effects, legal insecurities and a lack of capital, the new owners have been very reluctant to 
invest in the maintenance of these systems. The facilities are now operated in an 
uncoordinated manner or not at all, and opportunistic and self-interested behaviour prevails. 
In socialist times, the technical infrastructures were built to suit the needs of huge production 
units with rather homogeneous interest structures. During the transition process, it has proved 
difficult to technically adapt the infrastructure to the needs of small units with heterogeneous 
interests, different production portfolios and economic potential (Theesfeld, 2001 and 2002; 
Penov, 2002; Busmanis, Zobena, Grinfelde and Dzalbe, 2002). 
4. Conclusions 
This paper illustrates that a plurality of reasons are responsible for the failure of the present 
institutional structure in the field of water management, and also of the plans to deal with the 
most serious problems in the ‘Schraden’ low moor region. These problems stem from 
intensive arable farming and complex melioration measures undertaken decades ago. The 
high water runoff caused by the increasing inability of the deteriorated soil to hold water 
cannot be prevented by existing weirs and dam plants, because these are mostly run-down and 
not operated in a co-ordinated manner. It has been argued that the reallocation of property 
rights over melioration systems, together with ineffective co-ordination mechanisms, have 
impeded appropriate land use. External effects, legal insecurities accompanied by 
enforcement problems, the fragmented land ownership structure and a high number of short-
term lease contracts have all combined to reduce the incentives for most farmers to take care 
of the melioration works individually. Due to its limited statutory rights in conjunction with 
its small financial room for manoeuvre, the present Water Association, as a local co-
ordination mechanism, appears to be an inadequate substitute for the dissolved melioration 
co-operatives. Furthermore, the complete and time-intensive restructuring process on all 
levels of water administration has resulted in still-cumbersome, or even non-existing, 
interrelations between different administrative layers, and also in rare trans-boundary 
contacts. A lack of water management plans and the organisational embeddedness of the 
Lower Water Authority also impede effective administrative work. Adding to this are the 
profoundly heterogeneous interests of different user or interest groups, such as the conflict 
between farmers and environmentalists over the ground water table.  
 
Due to low excludability and high rivalry, drainage and irrigation can be regarded as common 
pool resources, often associated with the ‘social dilemma’ of resource usage (Ostrom, 1998; 
Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 1999). Here, it is neither sufficient to simply establish a system of 
private property rights, nor to look for central government control. Numerous and extensive 
case studies suggest that essential property rights over resource water and over related 
infrastructure - e.g., rights to use and modify the infrastructure - should be transfered to 
collectively-organised local actors to overcome the ‘social dilemma’ (Ostrom, 1998; 
Vermillion, 1999). However, besides clearly-defined property rights over land and water 
(infrastructure)8, some necessary prerequisites for encouraging collective action would be 
organisational self-determination, as well as some governmental support with regard to 
technical advisory and extension services, and financial assistance for larger infrastructure 
investments (Vermillion, 1999). Furthermore, some basic stock in social capital and tradition 
in collective action are also making positive contributions (Moss, 2001). 
                                                 
8 “however disintegrated, property rights must be clarified if accountability is to be insured” (Stark, 1996: 1020). 
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The established concept of Water Associations as local co-ordination mechanisms – which 
rather successfully operates in the old ‘Länder’ – very much depends on effective property 
rights and clear accountabilities for the melioration works, as well as on some (financial) state 
support. In the presented case, however, not all of these preconditions are satisfactorily met. 
This is even more problematic since most facilities in the ‘Schraden’ have not been 
maintained for long periods of time, and relatively high investments are necessary to make 
them functional again. Considering the poor state of the ‘Land’ budget and the low potential 
of the Water Association to raise additional membership fees, the situation presents a 
significant challenge. 
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